We examine the relationship between economic inequality and criminal activity. Previous research on this subject has focused on inequality in income, despite the fact that income is not directly observable within a community. We focus instead on the visible manifestations of inequality -consumption behavior. Examining variation within U.S. states over nearly two decades, we document a robust association between the distribution of visible consumption and violent criminal offences. Furthermore, we present evidence suggesting that a portion of the observed association between inequality and crime occurs through an expenditure channel. Exploiting the nature of conspicuous consumption, we attempt to shed light on the existing causal stories explaining crime. Our results are consistent with social theories which connect violent crime with relative deprivation. Surprisingly, evidence from property offences provides little support for existing economic explanations of crime which rely on information and opportunity cost.
I. Introduction
The distribution of resources and its social consequences are of fundamental interest to social scientists. Recent research has documented a robust correlation between income inequality and crime rates both within and across countries (see, for example, Kelly, 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 2002a; Demombynes and Ozler, 2005) . Across the board, studies have focused on income inequality and income poverty as factors motivating individuals to engage in crime. We argue that this approach fails to recognize that income is actually an opaque measure, particularly at the individual level.
Instead, the act of consumption and the display of opulence drive home the reality of social and economic inequality within a community. 1 While criminal behavior is often attributed to economic and social inequality, studies have been unable to rigorously distinguish between the leading explanations for this phenomenon. The present research examines this relationship in a behavioral framework by incorporating available information on consumption signaling. First, we examine the relationship between inequality in visible consumption and crime within U.S. states over nearly two decades. We document a positive and significant association for violent crime but not for property crime, a finding that is consistent with the existing literature which employs income rather than expenditure (Kelly, 2000) . Second, we show that the observed relationship between income inequality and crime is, for some forms of crime, partially attributable to inequality in visible expenditure. This may account for some of the ambiguity found in the literature as described by Land et al. (1990) and Soares (2005) . Finally, we develop an empirical method for sorting between competing explanations of this phenomenon by exploiting variation in the visibility of consumption activities and in types of criminal activity. Our results are consistent with social theories which connect violent crime with relative deprivation and provide mixed evidence concerning economic theories which connect property crime with information and opportunity cost.
Economic theory on criminal behavior originated with Becker (1968) , who suggested that individuals rationally evaluate the pros and cons of engaging in crime and then choose their optimal course of action. In this framework, the gap between the poor (who are considering crime) and the rich accounts for much of the expected net benefit of criminal activity. 2 Thus, when inequality increases, ceteris paribus, the incentive to engage in crime also rises. Similarly, a high degree of income inequality or a relatively severe level of poverty could also be interpreted as a low opportunity cost of engaging in illicit activity because choosing a life of crime would mean foregoing a smaller amount of traditional "legal" income.
Two prominent theories within the sociological literature provide alternative explanations for this relationship. Beginning with Merton (1938) , "Strain Theory" argues that the inability to attain pecuniary success through legal endeavors creates a sense of disenfranchisement with societal conventions and leads individuals to view crime as a means to attain these goals. Under Strain Theory, when inequality rises, feelings of relative deprivation heighten, increasing the motivation for criminal behavior. In a similar vein, "Social Disorganization Theory" suggests inequality directly weakens community ties by reducing social capital. Regions of high economic inequality exhibit above average levels of poverty, residential mobility, racial heterogeneity, and family instability; factors which (according to social disorganization theory) are conducive to criminal behavior because they serve to attenuate social cohesion (Kelly, 2000) .
These explanations are also consistent with the early consumer demand theory of Duesenberry (1949) and Liebenstein (1950) , which asserts that individuals obtain utility not only from their own consumption, but also from the level of their consumption relative to others.
Recently economists have begun to search for consumption externalities of this nature in empirical data, often referred to in the literature as "demonstration" or "Veblen" effects. Luttmer (2005) finds evidence in the U.S. that increased earnings among an individual's neighbors negatively impacts selfreported happiness. 3 Similarly, Maurer and Meier (2008) document that individuals make an effort to smooth their consumption relative to the consumption of their neighbors; in other words there is some evidence that individuals do attempt to "keep up with the Joneses." 4 Similarly, the prominent explanation for the "Easterlin Paradox" -in which survey based measures within a country show individuals with higher income reporting greater happiness, yet corresponding increases in national income show no effect on happiness -is that individuals care more about their relative than their absolute position in society (Easterlin, 1995; Luttmer, 2005) .
Our work is also related to and borrows from literature on the subject of consumption visibility. The concept can be traced to early thinkers including Plato, Hobbes, and Adam Smith, all of whom recognized that expenditures could be used to display wealth or to gain honor (Heffetz, 2004) . This analysis invokes the notion of "conspicuous consumption" associated with the writings of Thorstein Veblen (1899) , who coined the term when describing visible expenditure for the purposes of demonstrating wealth within society. Modern economic research often approaches conspicuous consumption within the context of signaling models, wherein individuals derive utility from the ability to showcase wealth or status through their consumption behavior (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Heffetz, 2004; Charles et al., 2009 ).
Finally, a related literature examines the possibility that individuals take into account the risk of expropriation when they make economic decisions which might convey signals of wealth, such as when purchasing a car. An undesired externality of visible expenditure may be that they offer criminals improved information about the potential benefits of crime. For instance, De Mello and Zilberman (2008) find increased savings behavior in cities of São Paulo, Brazil which have higher rates of property crime. Similarly, in the U.S., Mejía and Restrepo (2010) argue that all visible goods convey information about an individual's wealth to potential criminals. They subdivide visible goods by their potential for loss due to theft and document a negative and significant impact of property crime on the consumption of goods they classify as "visible but non-stealable." This paper proceeds as follows. Section II examines the existing literature documenting a relationship between economic inequality and crime. Section III describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section IV explores the underlying relationship between inequality and crime using changes in visible consumption over time within U.S. states. Section V explores the robustness of our findings to alternative specifications and samples. Section VI outlines leading theories for this relationship and proposes an empirical strategy for distinguishing among them. Section VII concludes.
II. Inequality and Crime
A sizeable literature explores the empirical relationship between inequality and crime in the United States. Early research emphasized the role of economic inequality as an underlying causal factor in driving crime rates. For instance, Blau and Blau (1982) find that income inequality has a statistically significant and sizeable influence on violent crime using data from 125 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). They argue that such inequality underlies the relationship between poverty and crime, accounts for the higher rates of crime in the U.S. South, and explains a large portion of the observed relationship between racial composition and crime rates. Hsieh and Pugh (1993) assemble a collection of previous empirical estimates and conduct a meta-analysis of the relationship of poverty rates and income Gini coefficients to crime, finding that 74 of 76 estimates documented a positive relationship. While estimates of the size of this relationship vary widely across studies, nearly 80% find a correlation of 0.25 or greater. Work reviewed by the authors included studies at various levels of aggregation including nations, states, MSAs, cities, police districts, and neighborhoods.
More recently, using data from 829 urban counties in the U.S., Kelly (2000) finds that income inequality is correlated with both violent and property crime. After controlling for poverty rates and demographic factors, the relationship between inequality and property crime disappears, while the impact of inequality on total violent crime remains large and significant with an estimated elasticity of 1.3. Kelly's analysis also adopts an IV strategy to account for the endogenous nature of police activity, finding that, although the point estimate is reduced in magnitude by roughly half, income inequality is still robustly associated with violent crime.
Estimates from a number of international studies have generally agreed with the results from the U.S. Analyzing changes in the wage structure in the U.K. from 1975 to 1996, Machin and Meghir (2004) show that declines in the relative earnings of low wage individuals are associated with higher levels of crime. Consistent with the economic explanation for criminal behavior, increases in deterrence measures such as the size of the police force significantly reduce crime. Demombynes and Ozler (2005) examine the relationship between income inequality and crime in South Africa at the level of the police precinct. They find that inequality within a precinct is highly correlated with property crimes but not with violent crime. The local nature of their data permits the examination of neighborhood income disparities and the authors find that precincts which are the wealthiest of their geographic neighbors experience burglary rates 25-43% higher than their less wealthy counterparts.
Similarly, violent crime is more frequent for areas in which inequality is high in the precinct and its neighboring area combined.
While most empirical studies examine local, regional, or national crime, there is some research which examines inequality and (primarily violent) crime across countries. Using the Deininger and Squire database on inequality and the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. (2002a Fajnzylber et al. ( , 2002b find that inequality and violent crime rates are positively correlated across a panel of nearly 40 countries. Furthermore, they find that this correlation is stronger across countries than within. Soares (2004) contends that while the within country evidence on inequality and crime is somewhat inconclusive, research to date across countries provides support for a positive relationship.
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After correcting for the fact that crime reporting rates are correlated with economic development, he documents a relationship between income inequality and crime, concluding that "reducing inequality from the level of a country like Colombia to levels comparable to Argentina, Australia, or United Kingdom, would reduce thefts by 50%, and contact crimes by 85%." This paper departs from the current literature by improving on the concept of inequality as it could plausibly relate to crime. A neighbor's income and bank account balance are by no means perfectly observable, for academic researchers let alone for individuals considering committing crimes.
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Nor are these factors likely to create strain within society or inform potential criminals of the expected gains from crime in the way in which they are invoked in the theories we described above. Intuition suggests that the relevant factor should be how individuals use their resources, and particularly how they choose to spend and display their income. Thus, by focusing on the choice and visibility of consumption activities, this analysis extends the previous literature by examining the relationship between crime and the physical manifestations of inequality.
III. Data

III A. Expenditure Data
We utilize household characteristics and annual consumption expenditure figures from the Harris and Sabelhaus (2000) NBER CEX family-level extracts for the period 1986-2002. 7 Although CEX data is available over a longer time period, for these seventeen years Harris and Sabelhaus constructed consumption categories that remain consistent in definition over time, which is key to our analysis. Nearly all households live in an urban area, which is unsurprising given that the CEX defines a region as urban if it is part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or an "urbanized" area of over 2,500 individuals. The distribution of respondents across regions suggests that the sample is well partitioned geographically.
Identifying the visibility of expenditure is not a trivial task. Recent studies have made an effort to define conspicuous consumption in the United States. Heffetz (2004 Heffetz ( , 2010 Table 1 provides the various definitions of conspicuous consumption derived from these two studies. We employ several measures of visibility in our analysis. Table 2 displays summary statistics on consumption behavior at the level of the household.
Total consumption expenditure averages nearly $10,400 per quarter per household. Between 11% and 44% of total expenditure can be classified as visible, depending on the definition of conspicuous consumption employed. Nearly all households report expenditure on visible consumption, which is driven primarily by the inclusion of clothing expenditure as a conspicuous component of consumption. The second panel of Table 2 examines individual components of visible consumption in further detail. (2010), who argues that many visible goods are luxuries with high income elasticities. Finally, we should emphasize that Figure 1 excludes households who report zero income. The treatment of these zeros is a concern in calculating inequality and Section V addresses the robustness of our results to the inclusion and exclusion of these households.
For income, expenditure, and our definitions of visible expenditure, we calculate several measures of inequality by state-year. We focus in particular on the Gini coefficient, because of its desirable properties such as Lorenz-consistency, and also because it is a familiar and easily interpretable measure. The Gini aggregates the normalized sum of the absolute value of pairwise differences in income or expenditure levels y for all possible pairs of individuals j and k from a population of size n: Table 1.  10 Appendix Table 3 provides state level estimates of the average Theil, Gini and CV from 1986-2002. expenditure, suggesting that the distribution of visible consumption is much more unequal than that for total expenditure, again consistent with visible goods behaving like luxury goods.
Figures 9a and 9b plot the Gini coefficient for various measures of inequality over time in the United States. Figure 9a shows that income inequality is much higher than inequality in expenditures for the entire period of focus for this study. In addition, income inequality in the U.S.
is generally increasing during this period, while inequality in total expenditure remains fairly flat.
Figure 9b additionally includes inequality in "visible consumption", which is an order of magnitude higher than income inequality but also fairly steadily increasing over time.
III B. Crime Data
Our estimates for criminal activity in the U.S. come from the Uniform Crime Reporting Violent crime, in contrast, shows relatively steady growth for the entire period. Property crime rates are an order of magnitude larger than those for violent crimes.
We focus on the period from 1986 to 2002, for which we have the detailed Harris and Sabelhaus (2000) consumption data. We employ annual crime statistics on a state by state basis for all categories of violent (assault, murder, rape and robbery) and property (burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft) crime. Figures 3 and 4 document both property and violent crime rates by category over our sample period. Downward trends at the national level are apparent for some property crimes such as burglary and larceny, whereas violent crimes exhibit more variation over the sample.
There are a number of quality concerns when working with crime statistics, perhaps the two most important including under-reporting of events and differential reporting across geographic areas (Blau and Blau, 1982) . Under-reporting likely varies across types of crime (for example murder is considered more likely to be reported than larceny or rape). Nonetheless, for our analysis, such concerns are second order. Our identification is achieved within states over time. As long as reporting rates do not change within these geographic areas over time (and we have not seen evidence that they do), then neither under-reporting nor spatial variation in reporting rates will affect our analysis. Figure 5 presents the distribution of counts of violent and property crimes per state-year in our sample. Both samples exhibit low mass points with extremely long right tails. We discuss the econometric issues that arise from a distribution of this nature, and how we deal with such issues, in the following section. Table 3 presents statistics on property and violent crime rates per state-year in our analysis sample. Property crimes are significantly more common than violent offences. As can be seen from the table, there is a high degree of variation across state-years, with states around the 75th percentile experiencing crime rates between 1.5 and 3 times those in the 25th percentile.
While the CEX is a nationally representative survey, it is not representative at the state level, and furthermore the public release files exclude household-level data for particular states and years.
In addition to measurement error induced by this, a potential concern is that exclusion from the data is more common for smaller states, which occurs to maintain anonymity among respondents in smaller geographic units. This is a problem because these states are both less densely populated and likely experience lower levels of crime (except for the notable exclusion of the District of Columbia).
11
Thus our sample may fail to reasonably generalize to the U.S. population at large. The last column of Table 3 presents property and violent crime rates for all state years including those omitted from the CEX. The 50th percentile of state-year crime rates is larger, but not dramatically so. Because our sample comprises forty of the fifty states, including the ones that contain the largest populations, our results are likely applicable to the vast majority of the U.S.
III C. Additional Covariates
We follow the existing literature when constructing controls for the traditional determinants of crime. Some of these require additional data sources, but several can be directly calculated from the CEX sample, which has the added benefit of consistency with our expenditure data. Following
Kelly (2000) and Demombynes and Ozler (2005) we construct a measure of family instability, defined as the percentage of households with a single female head of household. Weak family structure is thought to reduce character formation in adolescents. The CEX also contain racial identifiers for four groups (African-American, Asian-American, Caucasian and Hispanic), which we include directly to the capture effect of racial heterogeneity.
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We calculate the share of individuals 11 Note that CEX data from the District of Columbia is available, but we had to exclude it from our analysis due the limited number of household-level observations from which to create inequality measures. 12 Similar measures are used in Blau and Blau (1992) , Kelly (2000) , and Demombynes and Ozler (2005) . 
IV. Results
In this section, we first document the association between income inequality and crime and show that a similar relationship holds for expenditure and crime within U.S. States. Second, we show that this relationship is robust to the inclusion of the standard determinants of crime in our regressions. The subsequent section examines the robustness of these results across various specifications and samples.
The depiction of violent and property crimes in Figure V suggests that we should employ a count model in our analysis of crime. Tests for over-dispersion indicate that criminal offences are in fact too disperse for the traditional Poisson count model. Hilbe (2007) describes the use of negative binomial regression models as appropriate when the event counts themselves are "intrinsically heteroskedastic, right skewed, and have a variance that increases with the mean of the distribution," which characterizes our data well. Nevertheless, as a check in Section V, we explore the robustness of our findings to alternative specifications, including OLS. Our regression equations take the following form:
where subscript i indexes a given state and t indexes time. X is a single measure of income or expenditure inequality which we vary across specifications. Z is a vector of the crime determinants listed in section III including unemployment, population, youth population share, race controls, education, family instability, and state and local police expenditures. Ω i represents state fixed effects and Ф t time fixed effects. We have logged our measures of inequality and all non-dummy controls, so that regression coefficients can be interpreted simply as elasticities.
Results from regression equation (2) are presented in Table 4 . Each cell represents a distinct regression --we explore the inclusion of multiple inequality measures jointly in the next section.
Every regression includes the full set of controls listed above including time and state fixed effects.
We suppress all results but our coefficients of interest as the reporting of controls would be cumbersome given the number of regressions. We do not report goodness of fit measures for our regressions, as those that exist for negative binomial regressions are essentially tied to model selection in the first place (which we argued earlier already suggested negative binomial to be the appropriate model).
Panel A of Table 4 presents results for violent criminal offences. Several findings are immediately apparent. First, we document an association between inequality and violent crime, driven by assaults, which is consistent with the findings of Danzinger and Wheeler (1975) , Blau and Blau (1982) , and Kelly (2000).
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We find an elasticity of roughly 0.1 which is generally lower than that found in the literature, but may result from aggregation to the state level, as a stronger relationship may exist at a more local level (and the aforementioned studies examined MSAs).
Second, inequality in total expenditure is insignificant, while inequality in visible expenditure classified according to the Charles narrow, Charles broad, and Heffetz definitions comes out positive and significant, with magnitudes similar to those for income inequality. Under the Heffetz Visible Expenditure measure, we also document a positive and significant relationship between inequality and murder.
It is not uncommon to find no relationship between income inequality and crime in the existing literature, with Demombynes and Ozler (2005) being a notable exception. Our results for property crime presented in Panel B are generally close to zero and often negative. With the exception of inequality in total expenditure, the estimated coefficients are rarely significant.
Income inequality and inequality in visible expenditure are highly correlated. An important question is whether one can say anything about the channel through which they influence crime. A priori, one might assume that because expenditure, particularly conspicuous consumption, is visible, then the relationship should operate through this channel. At the same time, the estimated coefficients in Panel A are no larger for visible expenditure than for income inequality.
14 Blau and Blau document a relationship with both assault and murder.
Another way of attacking this question is to remove the variation in income inequality correlated with visible expenditure and see if the remaining variation, or residuals, remain significant in explaining crime. We present the results from the second stage of this exercise in Table 6, for A final possibility would be to examine the robustness of income inequality and visible expenditure inequality results. If the true connection is between visible expenditure and crime, we might expect this relationship to be more robust. The following section runs a number of robustness checks, and in some cases, the income inequality results disappear while the visible expenditure results remain. This is particularly true for the inclusion of zero income earners and the use of an alternative measure of inequality suggested by Kelly (2000) which examines the ratio of mean income to the median.
V. Robustness
We have documented a positive and significant relationship between changes in visible expenditure inequality and violent offences over time within U.S. states. This section explores the robustness of these findings and addresses a number of empirical concerns.
VI A. Alternative Measures of Inequality and Treatment of Zero Income Households
The Gini Coefficient is a measure of inequality which factors in the entire distribution and is thus sensitive to Dalton transfers between any two individuals. One potential concern is that because crime is predominantly committed within poor communities that the use of the Gini is inappropriate. In order to address this concern, Table 6 
VI B. Alternative Estimation Strategies
Count models are regularly employed in the analysis of crime and we believe appropriate in the context of our analysis. We presented evidence that the distribution of crimes across states is bounded by zero, has a long right tail, and contains excessive levels of dispersion, factors which suggest a Negative Binomial regression is more appropriate than both OLS and Poisson models (Hilbe, 2007) . 15 Nonetheless, if the distribution of criminal offences is normal in the log of the crime rate, then log-linear OLS estimates should yield similar results. Table 8 reproduces the results of   Table 5 for violent crime. As can be seen, the estimated elasticities from OLS are similar in magnitude to the Negative Binomial results and the general pattern of significance across inequality measures for total violent crimes and assaults is consistent. Finally, it should be noted because our estimation strategy involves aggregation to the level of U.S. states, there is no particular evidence to suggest that a zero-inflated model would be more appropriate.
VI. On the Determinants of Crime
In this section we address existing theory which posits a connection between inequality and criminal behavior. Understanding the channel through which socioeconomic inequality may be linked to crime is important for both designing crime prevention policy and for formulating research. To date, studies have struggled to explain the mechanism underlying this association. In this section, we attempt a preliminary and exploratory exercise in which we exploit one plausible channel through which income inequality may directly influence crime -the display of visible material wealth -to sort between competing explanations for why one should expect a relationship to exist in the first place.
Distinguishing between economic and sociological theories of inequality and crime is a challenging endeavor for a number of reasons. First, the prominent explanations discussed in Section I are similar in nature and yield some overlapping predictions. Second, determinants of criminal behavior are multifaceted. For example, even evidence which suggests that the majority of crimes are inflicted by the poor on other poor individuals does not necessarily conflict with the economic explanation for crime because potential victims differ both in their resources and in their accessibility to criminals. Research has shown that the rich have better access to protective services, and thus the probability of being caught faced by potential burglars would be higher (Bourguignon, 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 2002a) . We attempt to sidestep these issues by exploiting the visibility of consumption expenditures to provide new tests to examine the fundamental connection between economic inequality and crime. Consider the following two propositions:
Proposition 1: Strain and social disorganization theory suggest that individuals should become disillusioned after observing others with greater economic success. If this is correct, then the association between inequality in conspicuous consumption and crime should be stronger than the relationship between inequality in total expenditure (or total income) and crime. Evidence of this discrepancy for either violent or property crime would be consistent with both sociological theories.
Consistent with social and strain theory, it can be seen from Panel A of Table 4 that for total violent crimes and for assaults in particular, the estimated relationship between visible expenditure inequality is significant and larger than that for total expenditure inequality. This pattern appears robust to exercises performed in the previous section and presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8.   16 Several questions remain however. First, as can be seen from Table 4 Panel B results, visible expenditure is insignificant in explaining property crimes. It could be driven by attenuation of the coefficient due to aggregation to the state level. Finally, the total expenditure Gini is negative and significant for some forms of property offenses which still demands additional explanation and thought.
Proposition 2: Because criminals face uncertainty concerning the benefits of crime, visible consumption by potential victims may serve to reduce informational asymmetries which would otherwise discourage their efforts. This reduction in information costs should only apply to the pecuniary benefits of property crime and not the psychic (or psychotic) gains attributable to violent crime. If Becker's standard economic theory is correct then the relationship between inequality in visible consumption and crime should be stronger than the relationship between inequality in total consumption and crime for property crimes, but not necessarily violent crime. Table 4 Panel B suggests that we do not observe this predicted association in our data. In fact, property results are not reported for the remainder of our regression exercises specifically because they are rarely significant and even less frequently yield positive coefficients. Our results thus provide no support in favor of the classical cost-benefit explanation for criminal behavior provided in Proposition 2. Of course, as with our previous findings, the same caveats apply. First, the possibility of reverse causality biasing down our coefficients as argued by Mejía and 
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VII. Conclusion
This paper extends the existing literature on inequality and crime by suggesting that the signaling nature of visible consumption behavior may be the driving factor behind such a connection.
Previous research on this subject has focused on inequality in income, despite the fact that income is an opaque measure of relative wellbeing.
First, examining variation within U.S. states over two decades, we document a strong association between the distribution of visible consumption and violent criminal offences, particularly assault. This relationship proves robust to the exclusion of outliers, the inclusion of zero income households, the use of different measures of inequality and alternative estimation strategies. Second, our results are inconclusive concerning the issue of whether the observed association between inequality and crime may occur in part because income and expenditure are connected. Residual regressions examining the connection between crime and the fraction of income inequality not correlated with inequality in visible expenditure are largely unchanged and remained significant. These results suggest a role for both income levels and visible expenditure in motivating crime.
Finally, exploiting the nature of conspicuous consumption and its influence across types of crime, we attempted to shed light on the existing causal stories explaining crime. Our results on violent crime are consistent with social disorganization and strain theory which suggest that higher inequality should be related to violent crime because it leads to greater relative deprivation. Our findings provide no support for Becker style explanations of criminal behavior if the visibility of expenditure carries information about the potential returns to illicit activities. Unfortunately, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that risk of expropriation limits the consumption of visible goods and thus biases down our inequality coefficients in the property crime regressions. Similarly, all of our results likely suffer from analysis at the state level. Future research should take to task the connection between conspicuous consumption and crime in a much more disaggregated setting. 
